In the new issue of History of the Human Sciences, Matt ffytche analyses the exclusion of traumatic histories from psychoanalytic accounts of the mid-twentieth century, through a detailed engagement with the figure of the father (and of family authority) in different forms of psychoanalytic theory. Focusing especially on the work of the German psychoanalyst, Alexander Mitscherlich, ffytche traces the filtering out of the historical experiences of Nazism and the war from psychoanalytic narratives of the social - but then their return in texts of the 1980s and 1990s, under the banner of a new interest in historical trauma.  Here, HHS Editor in Chief, Felicity Callard, interviews Matt about his article.  Felicity Callard (FC): Maybe we can start off with the institutional context in which you work. You have recently transitioned from being the director of a Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies to becoming the head of a new Department of Psychosocial and Psychoanalytic Studies. Can you tell us more about this new department, and what its emergence tells us about

the history and sociology of psychoanalysis in the present? Matt ffytche (Mf): It’s a very exciting moment for us, and a fascinating, transitional moment for the discipline. In many UK institutions, programmes connected to psychoanalysis have been in long-term decline, I think mainly because of the way in which Centres or Units which were once set up in relationship with schools of psychology or health, have found the disciplinary ground being whittled away from under their feet as the institutions which housed them have gone more and more quantitative. In the humanities, I think interest in psychoanalysis has remained steady (usually in its Lacanian form) but just as part of the general critical mix – it has rarely dealt in full-scale psychoanalytic programmes. The University of Essex, along with Birkbeck and a few other institutions, have bucked this trend and found a real impetus to growth around such topics as psychoanalysis and the psychosocial – and this…

Illness and suffering precede any science; they call for medical intervention, which in turn shapes and formats states of illness into medical problems. Philosophy of medicine as the reasoning about the fundamental problems medicine is concerned with, should not start with an analysis of the problems as defined in medical practice but open its analysis to the formatting of these problems by medicine. Illness and suffering obviously go far beyond the boundaries of medicine, and medical practice addresses them explicitly and in scientific ways. Philosophy of medicine should hence also comprise a reflection about how it addresses health and illness.

An Interview with Cornelius Borck on his recently published book, Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung, 2016. Junius: Hamburg) by Lara Keuck Philosophy of medicine is booming. In the past decade or so, several special issues, textbooks and anthologies have been published that promise to chart the field. One of the most recent additions to this body of literature is The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, edited by Miriam Solomon, Jeremy Simon and Harold Kincaid. While the editors strive to include a broad array of perspectives, their ‘predominant thread is the philosophy of medicine treated as part of the Anglophone philosophy of science tradition’ (p.2). Earlier last year, Cornelius Borck, Professor of History of Medicine and Science Studies at the University of Lübeck in Germany, published a quite different book. Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung) advocates a closer affiliation of philosophy of medicine with history, anthropology, and social studies of medicine, as well as

with the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, moving it away from the predominant thread of analytic (and Anglophone) philosophy of science. As more and more fields of life become medicalized, and indeed often seem to be inevitably medical, Borck urges his readers to stand back, and to look at the 'functioning logics’' (Funktionslogik) of evidence-based medicine, biomedicine, or palliative medicine from a critical distance. He puts the distinction between experiencing an illness and having a disease up front, and makes a strong argument that philosophy of medicine ought not be reduced to serving medicine in clarifying biomedical concepts of disease. Rather, philosophers of medicine should think about health and illness as phenomena of human life, for which medicine provides but one 'pattern of interpretation’ (Deutungsmuster). Borck exemplifies past and present approaches of medical reasoning. He opposes pre-modern doctors’ attempts of accompanying people through their illness to current trends of overly focusing on intervening medically into human conditions. Borck is…