The dream of universal knowledge was often also a dream of extending the agency of individual men, institutions, nations, to encompass totalities which would then be pressed into their service, and a the same time used as a means of by which to draw in ever-greater quantities of data.

Wellcome Historical Medical Museum: General view of first floor - 1928. Credit: Wellcome Collection - CC-BY

The December 2018 issue of The History of the Human Sciences presents a collection of essays dedicated to understanding the historical, political, moral and aesthetic issues in totalizing projects of late modernity - ‘The Total Archive: Data, Identity, Universality.’ Here the issue’s editors, Boris Jardine and Matthew Drage, discuss the origins of the project and some of their ideas about the image and pragmatics of universal knowledge. Matthew Drage (MD): Boris, tell me a bit about how the idea for this special issue came about? Boris Jardine (BJ): I was visiting the Max Planck Institute (MPI) for the History of Science (Berlin) in 2014, as part of the working group ‘Historicizing Big Data’ – but I was only at the MPI briefly, and when I was back in Cambridge I wanted to do something that drew on what I’d learnt there, involving some of the fantastic scholars I’d met. It seemed to me that the idea/reality of ‘The Archive/archives’ supervened

on notions of ‘data’, and that there were philosophical, ethical and historical issues around classification, privacy and knowledge that became pressing when the concept of ‘totality’ came into play. I was also talking to historians in different fields – economic history, history of bio-medicine, art history/aesthetics – and wanted to do something that connected those. With some colleagues I proposed a conference at CRASSH (Centre for Research in Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities) in Cambridge, which happened in March 2015. So this has been a while germinating! MD: I know might be is a slightly strange side of the story , but my recollection is that it was also connected to an art project that we were both involved in. BJ: Yes, ‘UA’, or ‘Elements of Religion’ as it was originally known. That was how I/we got to the idea of the aesthetics of totality, as a (quasi) religious idea. I wrote about that in the special issue of LIMN…

Mindfulness teaches historians that time is itself a movable feast; that we should take seriously the possibility of a history of alternative or non-standard ways of thinking about time...There is a sense in which by practising mindfulness, and especially by practising on retreat, one is removing oneself from the usual run of historical time. I think that it would be extremely interesting to think about how to do a history of this phenomenon; a history of the way people, especially within contemplative traditions, have sought to exit historical time.

A butcher's boy, reading to improve his mind, is so absorbed in his book that his delivery of meat is stolen by a passer-by. Coloured etching by T.L. Busby, 1826. Licensed via CC-BY. Credit: Wellcome Collection

Matthew Drage is an artist, writer and postdoctoral researcher. He lately completed his PhD at the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge, and is now Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the History of Art, Science and Folk Practice, at the Warburg Institue, in the School of Advanced study, University of London. His first article from his PhD, Of mountains, lakes and essences: John Teasdale and the transmission of mindfulness, appeared in December 2018, as part of the HHS special issue, 'Psychotherapy in Europe,' edited by Sarah Marks. Here Matthew talks to Steven Stanley - Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University, and Director of the Leverhulme-funded project, Beyond Personal Wellbeing: Mapping the Social Production of Mindfulness in England and Wales - about the article, and his wider research agenda on mindfulness in Britain and America.   Steven Stanley (SS): This article is your first publication based on your PhD research project, which you recently

completed. Congratulations! Can you tell us a bit about your PhD project? Matthew Drage (MD): Thank you! So yes, my PhD project was a combined historical and ethnographic project which focused on the emergence of “mindfulness” as a healthcare intervention in Britain and America since the 1970s. My main question was: why was mindfulness seen by its proponents as such an important thing to do? Why did they seek to promote it so actively and vigorously? I focused on a key centre for the propagation of mindfulness-based healthcare approaches in the West: the Center for Mindfulness in Health, Care and Society at the University of Massachuestts Medical Center. I also looked at the transmission of mindfulness from Massachusetts to Britain in the 1990s - this is an episode I narrate in the article. I had a real sense, when I did my fieldwork, archival research and oral history interviews, that for people who practice and teach it as their main…

If I stress that there are different kinds of uncertainties then this is partly because I think that different kinds of uncertainties have different kinds of causes –– and partly because I think that there is no obvious link between the epistemic uncertainty I have been cultivating and the kinds of uncertainties that plague, for example, the doctor-patient relation in medicine.

The risen Christ shows his lance wound to Saint Thomas. Engraving by J. Sturt. CC-BY. Credit: Wellcome Collection.

This is the second part of a two-part interview, between Vanessa Rampton, Branco Weiss Fellow at the Chair of Practical Philosophy, ETH Zurich, and the anthropologist Tobias Rees, Director of the 'Transformations of the Human Program' at the Berggruen Institute in Los Angeles, and author of the new monograph, After Ethnos (Duke). The discussion took place following a workshop on Rees's work at the Zurich Center for the History of Knowledge in 2017. You can read the first part of the interview here. 4. Uncertainty and/as Political Practice Vanessa Rampton (VR): I want to continue our conversation by asking you about the implications of foregrounding uncertainty and the ‘radical openness’ you mentioned earlier for aspects of life that are explicitly normative. Take politics, for example. Have you thought about the political implications of embracing uncertainty, and what could be necessary to facilitate communication, or participation, or what it is you think is important? Tobias Rees (TR): For me, the reconstitution

of uncertainty or ignorance is principally a philosophical and poetic practice. These concepts are not reducible to the political. But they can assume the form of a radical politics of freedom. VR: How so? TR: For a long time, in my thinking, I observed the classical distinction between the political as the sphere of values and the intellectual as the sphere of reason. And as such I could find politics important, a matter of passion, but I also found it difficult to relate my interest in philosophical and anthropological questions to politics. And I still think the effort to subsume all Wissenschaft, all philosophy, all art under the political is vulgar and destructive. However, over the years, largely through conversations with the anthropologist, Miriam Ticktin, I have learned to distinguish between a concept of politics rooted in values and a concept of politics rooted in the primacy of the intellectual or the artistic. I think that today we often encounter…

I think that the human sciences have been primarily practiced as a decoding sciences. That is to say, researchers in the human sciences usually don’t ask ‘What is the human?’ No, they already knew what the human is: a social and cultural being, endowed with language. Equipped with this knowledge they then make visible all kinds of things in terms of society and culture. In addition, perhaps, one could argue that the human sciences have established themselves as guardians of the human – that is, they have been practiced in defensive terms. Now, if one destabilizes the figure of the human neither one of these two forms of knowledge production can be maintained.

'Human embryonic stem cells' by Jenny Nichols. Credit: Jenny Nichols. CC BY

In his recent books, Plastic Reason: An Anthropology of Brain Science in Embryogenetic Terms (University of California Press, 2016) and After Ethnos (Duke University Press, 2018), the anthropologist Tobias Rees explores the curiosity required to escape established ways of knowing, and to open up what he calls “new spaces for thinking + doing.” Rees argues that acknowledging – and even embracing – the ignorance and uncertainty that underpin all forms of knowledge production is a crucial methodological part of that process of escape. In his account, doubt and instability are bound up with a radical openness that is necessary for breaking apart existing gaps and allowing the new/different to emerge - in the natural but also in the human sciences. But are there limits to such an embrace of epistemic uncertainty? How does this particular uncertainty interact with other forms of uncertainty, including existential uncertainties that we experience as vulnerable human beings? And how does irreducible epistemic uncertainty

relate to ethical claims about how to live a good life? What is the relation of a radical political practice of freedom with art? After a workshop on his work at the Zurich Center for the History of Knowledge in 2017, Vanessa Rampton, Branco Weiss Fellow at the Chair of Practical Philosophy, ETH Zurich, explored these themes with Rees.   1. The Human Vanessa Rampton (VR): Tobias, your recent work aims to destabilize and question common understandings of the human. I wonder how you would place your work in relation to other engagements with ‘selfhood’ within the history of philosophy, and the history of the human sciences more widely. Because there are so many ways of thinking of the self – for example the empirical, bodily self, or the rational self, or the self as relational, a social construct – that you could presumably draw on. But I also know that you want to move beyond previous attempts to capture the nature and meaning…

In the new issue of History of the Human Sciences, Matt ffytche analyses the exclusion of traumatic histories from psychoanalytic accounts of the mid-twentieth century, through a detailed engagement with the figure of the father (and of family authority) in different forms of psychoanalytic theory. Focusing especially on the work of the German psychoanalyst, Alexander Mitscherlich, ffytche traces the filtering out of the historical experiences of Nazism and the war from psychoanalytic narratives of the social - but then their return in texts of the 1980s and 1990s, under the banner of a new interest in historical trauma.  Here, HHS Editor in Chief, Felicity Callard, interviews Matt about his article.  Felicity Callard (FC): Maybe we can start off with the institutional context in which you work. You have recently transitioned from being the director of a Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies to becoming the head of a new Department of Psychosocial and Psychoanalytic Studies. Can you tell us more about this new department, and what its emergence tells us about

the history and sociology of psychoanalysis in the present? Matt ffytche (Mf): It’s a very exciting moment for us, and a fascinating, transitional moment for the discipline. In many UK institutions, programmes connected to psychoanalysis have been in long-term decline, I think mainly because of the way in which Centres or Units which were once set up in relationship with schools of psychology or health, have found the disciplinary ground being whittled away from under their feet as the institutions which housed them have gone more and more quantitative. In the humanities, I think interest in psychoanalysis has remained steady (usually in its Lacanian form) but just as part of the general critical mix – it has rarely dealt in full-scale psychoanalytic programmes. The University of Essex, along with Birkbeck and a few other institutions, have bucked this trend and found a real impetus to growth around such topics as psychoanalysis and the psychosocial – and this…

Illness and suffering precede any science; they call for medical intervention, which in turn shapes and formats states of illness into medical problems. Philosophy of medicine as the reasoning about the fundamental problems medicine is concerned with, should not start with an analysis of the problems as defined in medical practice but open its analysis to the formatting of these problems by medicine. Illness and suffering obviously go far beyond the boundaries of medicine, and medical practice addresses them explicitly and in scientific ways. Philosophy of medicine should hence also comprise a reflection about how it addresses health and illness.

An Interview with Cornelius Borck on his recently published book, Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung, 2016. Junius: Hamburg) by Lara Keuck Philosophy of medicine is booming. In the past decade or so, several special issues, textbooks and anthologies have been published that promise to chart the field. One of the most recent additions to this body of literature is The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, edited by Miriam Solomon, Jeremy Simon and Harold Kincaid. While the editors strive to include a broad array of perspectives, their ‘predominant thread is the philosophy of medicine treated as part of the Anglophone philosophy of science tradition’ (p.2). Earlier last year, Cornelius Borck, Professor of History of Medicine and Science Studies at the University of Lübeck in Germany, published a quite different book. Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung) advocates a closer affiliation of philosophy of medicine with history, anthropology, and social studies of medicine, as well as

with the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, moving it away from the predominant thread of analytic (and Anglophone) philosophy of science. As more and more fields of life become medicalized, and indeed often seem to be inevitably medical, Borck urges his readers to stand back, and to look at the 'functioning logics’' (Funktionslogik) of evidence-based medicine, biomedicine, or palliative medicine from a critical distance. He puts the distinction between experiencing an illness and having a disease up front, and makes a strong argument that philosophy of medicine ought not be reduced to serving medicine in clarifying biomedical concepts of disease. Rather, philosophers of medicine should think about health and illness as phenomena of human life, for which medicine provides but one 'pattern of interpretation’ (Deutungsmuster). Borck exemplifies past and present approaches of medical reasoning. He opposes pre-modern doctors’ attempts of accompanying people through their illness to current trends of overly focusing on intervening medically into human conditions. Borck is…