On the unexamined presence of psychotherapeutics- an interview with Sarah Marks

We were delighted in April 2017 to publish a special issue of History of the Humans Sciences, ‘Psychotherapy in Historical Perspective,’ edited by Sarah Marks, currently based at Birkbeck, University of London, as part of the Wellcome Trust-funded Hidden Persuaders project. HHS Web editor, Des Fitzgerald, spoke to Sarah about the special issue – and about how we might (re-)think the history of the psychotherapeutic complex today. 

Des Fitzgerald (DF): Sarah, thanks for taking the time for this interview. Why a history of psychotherapy, now, in 2017?

Sarah Marks (SM): The history of psychotherapy does seem to be having something of a moment right now. There’s recently been the Other Psychotherapies conference at Glasgow, the Transcultural Histories of Psychotherapy conferences at UCL, special issues of this journal, and forthcoming issues of History of Psychology and The European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling. So I’m happy to say that this seems to representative of a blossoming field.

The seed for this issue came about a few years back, though. As a graduate student I was very surprised at how fractional the literature seemed to be by comparison with work on, say, psychiatric diagnostics and the ‘Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorder,’ psychopharmaceuticals, or asylums and institutions. I thought there must be others out there working on it, and there were. It’s probably particularly relevant that I came to it initially from trying to figure out how Cognitive Behaviour Therapy become such a significant force in the UK. I don’t especially privilege ‘histories of the present’ as an approach, but I think psychotherapies as interventions – and psychotherapeutic knowledge in broader terms – do have something of an unexamined presence in contemporary society and policy, in various forms. I note that there is currently a growing critique, or even backlash against this in Britain, including from therapists themselves.  So taking a historical approach now makes good sense – it reminds us that these are by no means timeless, value-free techniques, about which there is a clear consensus. And it also helps us to excavate their intellectual foundations, which aren’t always that transparent.

But beyond the ethical or political motivations for historicizing psychotherapy, there’s a fascinating variety of stories to be unearthed. Even just in this special issue, there are vastly different models of mind, debates about cultural or moral decline, questions of identity or normality and pathology, ideas about cure or the nature of human relationships, resistance movements, and the political spectrum across left and right, to name but a few. And that’s just from looking at predominantly West European and North American examples.

 

DF: For many I think, a Venn diagram showing intersections between the history of psychotherapy and the history of psychoanalysis will more or less form a circle. But I get a strong sense that this special issue wants to prise these two apart somewhat. Is that right? And why, if so?

SM: Yes, you’re right about that. I’m not of the opinion that the history of psychoanalysis has reached its end point, as some have begun to argue. I’m working myself on its legacies in the Soviet sphere during the Cold War at the moment. There still is much to be done there. But it really has overshadowed other approaches in the literature quite drastically.

This could be because psychoanalysis has been very a productive interpretive strategy in the arts and humanities: we’re all familiar with it, and it has been very successful at captivating audiences outside of its clinical setting. It would be hard to say that about, say, behaviourism, or Gestalt. So it’s understandable that we have more histories of it. But its popularity in these spheres, and as an actual clinical movement in the 20th century, has led to a sort of Whiggish dominance of this one particularly successful approach. This has been at the expense of lots of other therapeutics or frameworks, which also had a real impact in their time, but that have now – for multiple, usually contingent reasons – been forgotten. A number of the contributions to the special issue uncover such stories: from late Victorian psychotherapeutics, to some quite peculiar Viennese competitors to Freud, or ways of understanding art therapy and psychosis.

The striking thing, though, is that from the mid-century up to the present, psychoanalysis has had some extremely militant challengers to the throne, which have, in some cases, exceeded it in terms of institutional power. Behavioural and cognitive approaches are the obvious candidates here, especially in the way they have mobilized trials and ‘evidence base’ for their cause. But there are others: Rogerian counselling has been ubiquitous at particular moments, and, increasingly, Mindfulness-based approaches. And there is an excellent emerging literature coming through that is beginning to address some of these gaps: the work of Rachael Rosner on Aaron Beck, and Matthew Drage’s forthcoming PhD on the history of Mindfulness in particular. But the fact that the ‘non-psychoanalytic circle in the Venn diagram’, as you elegantly put it, has had very little historical interrogation thus far, has quite significant implications given the status they’ve acquired.

I would be curious to think more about the nature of the overlap of the two circles. Is there a degree to which we can say that most modern psychotherapies are indebted to psychoanalysis in some sense, in terms of how we have come to structure an interpersonal therapeutic relationship? How have some of the norms of analytic training, or its ethical framework, been kept up by other approaches, which have otherwise emphatically broken away from psychoanalysis? And how have other traditions been formed in explicit opposition to, or in dialogue with Freudian thought? Perhaps we should actually draw out your suggested Venn diagram on a blackboard and see where it leads…

 

DF: There is of course a well-known view – coming especially from scholars in the wake of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault –that the history of ‘psy’ science tends towards recurrence: that to (as Nikolas Rose puts it) work ‘within the true’, as a psychotherapeutic practitioner, is also to work with a history of the truthfulness of one’s own practices, and vice versa. Do you agree with this view? And where does it leave the historian?

SM: There is something to it. I mention in the introduction to the special issue the question of therapeutic traditions, and Laurence Spurling’s comment that the texts of the founders can come to play an almost Talmudic role in particular professional communities, which can at times lead to a sort of conservatism, or I suppose a ‘recurrence’, to use your quotation. There certainly are dogmatic ‘believers’ out there in the therapy world, for whom the history of the profession is mainly useful for the purposes of legitimising their ways of seeing, which are wholeheartedly assumed to be true. But that’s not a universal stereotype at all.

Working at Birkbeck, I’m currently surrounded by clinicians, many of them psychoanalytic (see this short video, for example). I do observe with curiosity the way they sometimes read or teach historical texts as sources for contemporary practical inspiration. But, at the same time, they also step outside and approach these ‘truths’ as culturally or historically situated, and examine them from a position of critical distance. This isn’t exclusive to the academy either: from interviewing full-time therapists in cognitive traditions, too, I’ve often seen this reflexive tension at play. But, from the historian’s perspective, the problem here is that we’re talking about practitioners in the way they behave and present themselves outside of the consulting room. What actually goes on when they work as clinicians is still mostly a black box to me – and that’s the case for those I am able to talk to, as well as those historical actors that I can only trace via their textual or archival paper trail. This has huge implications for what it means to write about the history of psychotherapy: mostly we’re just reconstructing the edges, without ever actually getting at the therapeutic interaction itself.

So I’m not sure I can fully agree with Rose, that we can say they are ‘working within the true’. One could infer from the evidence that this is probably what is going on, sure. But I often wonder whether it could be the norm that there are slippages around such ‘truths’ in practice, (perhaps especially in a health service where policy dictates that clinicians deliver a particular brand of therapy, which they themselves might be critical of). Therapists might integrate different approaches that contain conflicting truth claims, or they could respond to a situation in a manner which might be guided by more banal or common-sense assumptions, or personal values, that have nothing at all to do with their professed psychological worldview. Or they might tailor a ‘therapeutic alliance’ around the belief system of the client, and work in such a way that necessitates the suspension of their own truths. There could be ways to research this question, to test the theory out a bit better. But as it stands, the historian, as usual, can only tell a partial story.

 

DF: One of the things that especially strikes me about the special issue – you gesture at this in the introduction – is that the patient or service-user is much more present, as an experiencing subject, than we are perhaps used to in histories of psychology and psychotherapy. How should we think about his shift in the literature (if indeed it marks a shift)?

SM: I’d say the recipient of therapy as an experiencing subject isn’t by any means as present as it should be. Patrick Kirkham’s article in the special issue really does place the service-user (or in his particular example of autistic self advocates and their objections towards Applied Behaviour Analysis, the service-resister) at the centre. And it’s interesting to note that Patrick came at this topic not from an interest in the history of therapeutics, but somewhat tangentially, from conducting his dissertation research on neurodiversity and the autism rights movement.

Despite the fact that the service-user-as-subject is the very point of most therapies, they are usually only implicit subjects in historical writing on psychotherapy. I’m as guilty of reiterating this in my own writing as anyone else, I admit. It’s something that really struck me when I was writing the introduction, looking over what literature existed. It is incredibly problematic, that we have this looming blank space with regard to the experience of the recipient of the treatment, who is often only seen refracted through the gaze of the therapist.

It’s obviously not difficult to account for this imbalance: there are many more archives and published primary sources from practitioners than there are from patients. It’s a classic problem in the history of medicine, but I think historians of other medical fields – even psychiatry – have been doing a better job of addressing it. So I think it’s a shift in the literature that definitely should happen, and which I will look to follow through in my own work. There are some good sources of inspiration in neighbouring fields in terms of more contemporary, ethnographically orientated research. Ilina Singh’s work on children’s understandings of their ADHD diagnosis springs immediately to mind, or Juliet Foster’s monograph, Journeys Through Mental Illness.

On the other hand, there certainly is a theorized, or perhaps imagined, service-user that has cropped up in the work of sociologists, philosophers and historians. I’m thinking here of Nikolas Rose again and his autonomous, liberal ‘self’ who governs themself through psychological technologies. Equally, Ian Hacking’s patient who becomes therapeutically labelled with, and then reinterprets themselves through, a ‘human kind’ such as multiple personality disorder. Or Sonu Shamdasani’s individual who might opt in or out of an ‘optional ontology’ offered to them by psychotherapy, or who may well present to a therapist having already defined themselves in such terms in the first place.

All of these seem to capture something about the psychotherapeutic subject, and intuitively I’d say they are productive concepts to think with. But the interesting question would be to see whether, or how, they hold true in actual service-user experience, and how subjects do – or indeed do not – act in these terms. What might be the nuances of the individual case, or the particular variant of psychotherapy? How might these differ across time period or culture, or down to the level of the particular kind of institution, clinic, or private practice? Or even by the mode of delivery of self-help intervention, which can be many and varied these days? I’d love to see more work on these questions.

 

DF: The special issue is composed of many (I mean this term, as I guess you do, in its most positive sense) emerging authors in the field – was this a deliberate decision as an editor? And why, if so?

To be honest, it’s because a high proportion of the people doing good work on this topic are at an early career stage, and they were the ones who came my way, by various means. So it feels as though the history of psychotherapy itself is something of an emergent field, even though there have been some really key publications from senior scholars in previous years, as I mention in the introduction. It wasn’t necessarily a deliberate editorial choice from the outset. But there is something to what you have noticed, as this isn’t the only edited volume I’ve been involved with which specifically foregrounds early career researchers. There probably is an implicit ethic there, in terms of wanting to open up space for newer authors, because there is a lot of inspiring new work out there. I have often thought this at recent conferences, that it bodes well for the future of the field.

In other editorial work I’ve done, I’ve also sought to encourage authors from non-anglophone academic backgrounds to publish. I think we can be incredibly North American and West European focused in our field. This doesn’t by any means reflect the quality of research that is being done by scholars elsewhere – it’s just that the latter doesn’t always make it into English-language publications.

 

DF: You yourself are (if I may use a deeply problematic term) an ‘early career’ scholar working in the history of mental health. I’m wondering, if it doesn’t make you groan too much –what advice would have for others entering the field (I’m think e.g. of those who have recently entered graduate study)?

SM: It’s interesting that you’re so apologetic about the use of ‘early career’. A number of colleagues, probably myself included, have found it quite a helpful designation: it can create a sort of solidarity amongst the precariously employed, and it at least implies that you might be en route to having a career! I’ve been part of a writing group within my department, made up of early career historians, which has been enormously galvanising, both creatively and in terms of pooling advice and information, and mutual support. So I’d advise those entering the field to get organised with those around you, within your own institutions and across the field more broadly. There’s a lot on offer already to help enable this, for postgraduates especially: conferences organised by the British Society for the History of Science, the Society for the Social History of Medicine, the Institute of Historical Research’s ‘History Lab’ etc.

I think another key thing is to start becoming an active member of the research community earlier rather than later. Don’t be shy about submitting work to journals (such as History of the Human Sciences!) once you have a good argument to make, and a strong research base to support it. Peer review can be gruelling, but it does help you shape your work for the better, and responding to that kind of critique is good preparation for the viva, not to mention job interviews. Put in for conferences, or organise your own conference if there’s a theme or question that you think really needs to be talked about more. That’s how this special issue originally came about, from putting out a call for conference papers during my PhD at University College London.

I’m often heartened by how supportive academics in this particular field can be towards fledgling researchers actually, in terms of advice and encouragement, from across different institutions. So I’d say it’s a very good community to be part of.

Psychotherapy in Historical Perspective is available now at the HHS website.

Sarah Marks is a postdoctoral researcher at Birkbeck, University of London working on the history of the psy-disciplines during the Cold War and after, with the Wellcome Trust funded Hidden Persuaders project . She is co-editor (with Mat Savelli) of Psychiatry in Communist Europe

Des Fitzgerald is social media and web editor of History of the Human Sciences, and a lecture in sociology at Cardiff University.

Book Review: ‘Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment.’

Han F. Vermeulen, Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015, $75.00. xxiii + 718 pages, ISBN: 978-0-8032-5542-5

by

Hilary Howes

The central argument of Han F. Vermeulen’s Before Boas, which checks in at an impressive – indeed, somewhat daunting – 718 pages, is presented with admirable conciseness at the very beginning of the first chapter.  Both ethnography, ‘conceived as a program for describing peoples and nations in Russian Asia and carried out by German-speaking explorers and historians’, and ethnology, developed by ‘historians in European academic centers dealing with a comprehensive and critical study of peoples’, ‘originated in the work of eighteenth-century German or German-speaking scholars associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences, the University of Göttingen, and the Imperial Library in Vienna’ (pp.1-2).  The formation of these studies, Vermeulen adds, ‘took place in three stages: (1) as Völker-Beschreibung or ethnography in the work of the German historian and Siberia explorer Gerhard Friedrich Müller during the first half of the eighteenth century, (2) as Völkerkunde and ethnologia in the work of the German or German-speaking historians August Ludwig Schlözer, Johann Christoph Gatterer, and Adam František Kollár during the second half of the eighteenth century, and (3) as ethnography or ethnology by scholars in other centers of learning in Europe and the United States during the final decades of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (pp.1-2).  Building particularly on existing research by Hans Fischer and Justin Stagl into the importance of Göttingen as a locus of early ethnographic work, Vermeulen pushes the earliest uses of the German terms Völkerkunde, Ethnographie, ethnographisch, and Ethnograph back by several years, and the concept, as Völker-Beschreibung (description of peoples), by several decades.  In the process, he also raises several significant overarching points, including the interconnectedness of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science in Western Europe and in Russia; the need to distinguish between ‘colonial anthropology’ and ‘anthropology developed in colonial contexts’; and the emergence of the ethnological sciences as part of global history (dealing with peoples and nations, defined primarily by their languages), rather than as part of anthropology (dealing with human varieties or ‘races’, defined primarily by their physical features).

Before Boas is divided into eight substantial chapters.  Chapter One, ‘History and Theory of Anthropology and Ethnology: Introduction’, and Chapter Eight, ‘Epilogue: Reception of the German Ethnographic Tradition’, usefully contextualise the real ‘meat’ of this study, namely Vermeulen’s exhaustive examination of little-known primary sources.  I particularly enjoyed Chapter Two, ‘Theory and Practice: G.W. Leibniz and the Advancement of Science in Russia’; Chapter Three, ‘Enlightenment and Pietism: D.G. Messerschmidt and the Early Exploration of Siberia’; and Chapter Four, ‘Ethnography and Empire: G.F. Müller and the Description of Siberian Peoples’.  As their titles suggest, these three interlinked chapters examine, respectively, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646-1716) development of a strict methodology in what would now be called comparative or historical linguistics; the itinerary, methods, and results of Daniel Gottlieb Messerschmidt (1685-1735), ‘the first scientifically trained explorer of Siberia’ and the first to ‘systematically conduct ethnographic research’ there (115); and the inauguration of ‘ethnography as a descriptive study of peoples’ by the historian Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705-1783).  In all three cases, Vermeulen points out, the general neglect by historians of these individuals’ contributions to the development of ethnography can largely be attributed to the ‘lack of published works’ (p.131).  An accurate assessment of Müller’s ethnographic work, for example, has only become possible with the very recent publication (in 2003, 2009, and 2010) of German and Russian editions of two of his manuscripts.

In addition to examining the published and unpublished writings of these three individuals – their correspondence, memoirs, reports, manuscripts, and maps – Vermeulen pays careful attention to their education and training, employment, contacts, and scholarly networks.  This approach emphatically underscores the remarkable mobility of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century savants, as well as the resulting interconnectedness of Western European and Russian science.  Vermeulen’s in-depth discussions of particular individuals and specific expeditions add valuable detail and nuance to existing scholarly work on Tsar Peter the Great’s ‘Petrine reforms’; the lower-level interactions he traces help flesh out contacts between figures at the top of the food chain.  For example, the establishment of an academy of sciences in Russia, which resulted in a significant influx of foreign scholars, is not described simply as a result of Leibniz’s meetings and correspondence with Tsar Peter the Great; rather, Vermeulen presents it as a multi-player process facilitated in large part by the Scottish head of the Apothecary Chancellery in Moscow, Robert Areskine (Erskine), and the Tsar’s main science adviser, Yakov Vilimovich Brius (Jacob Daniel Bruce).

In contrast to Chapters Two, Three, and Four, which blend seamlessly into one another, Chapter Five, ‘Anthropology and the Orient: C. Niebuhr and the Danish-German Arabia Expedition’, seemed to me to sit rather awkwardly within the structure of the book as a whole. Vermeulen introduces it by explaining that its ‘apparent lack of a colonial context … will give us occasion to further comment on the relation between ethnography and empire’, and that its ‘contributions to ethnological discourse were much less pronounced than Müller’s Siberian venture’, this being ‘a contrast that requires elucidation’ (p.218).  Perhaps it does, but 48 pages of elucidation struck me as excessive, particularly since Vermeulen’s main conclusion is essentially negative: the ‘new, “ethnic” principle’ introduced by German-speaking scholars in the Russian Empire, their ‘classification of “peoples” according to their languages’, was ‘not found in Niebuhr’s work’ (p.266).  As for Vermeulen’s insistence on the distinction ‘between “colonial anthropology” and “anthropology developed in colonial contexts”’ (p.28), I felt that this point, although undeniably important, was adequately made in Chapter Four.

Chapter Six, ‘From the Field to the Study: A.L. Schlözer and the Invention of Ethnology’, picks up where Chapter Four left off.  Having traced the concept of ethnography, in the form Völker-Beschreibung, to Müller’s research in Siberia (1740), Vermeulen concedes that the historian August Ludwig Schlözer (1735-1809) was ‘probably the man who invented the term Völkerkunde’ (270).  More importantly, Schlözer ‘was the first to initiate an “ethnographic method” into the study of history”; he employed the concepts Völkerkunde, Ethnographie, ethnographisch, and Ethnograph ‘in strategic passages that were central to his argument’, and ‘held a key position in the international network of scholars first applying the ethnos terms to designate a study of peoples’ (pp.270-271).  While I share James Urry’s (2016: 1) concern that the search for ‘points of origin for ideas and concepts … too often resembles that for the Holy Grail’, I could not help but be impressed by Vermeulen’s meticulously compiled table tracing the history of ‘Ethnological discourse in Asia, Europe, and the United States, 1710-1815’, from Leibniz’s historia etymologica in 1711-12 to B.G. Niebuhr’s Völker- und Länderkunde in 1815 (354-355).  A further valuable aspect of Chapter Six is the attention Vermeulen pays to the proliferation, in the final decades of the eighteenth century, of journals with Völkerkunde in their titles.  These were, in a sense, the first ethnological journals, but the phenomenon has largely been neglected by modern scholars.

Chapter Seven, ‘Anthropology in the German Enlightenment: Plural Approaches to Human Diversity’, offers an overview of anthropological studies in the German Enlightenment.  From a survey of major publications with the word ‘anthropology’ (or its French, German, Italian, and Latin equivalents) in their titles, Vermeulen concludes that anthropology was in fact a ‘polyvalent’ term, used not only for physical and biological approaches but for medical, theological, and philosophical ones (p.393).  He adds that anthropology ‘up until the eighteenth century … was very different from ethnology’; while the former ‘focused on human beings as individuals or as members of the human species’, the latter ‘dealt with particular kinds of human groupings, that is, peoples and nations’ (p.393).  This chapter, unlike the previous ones, is a summary rather than an in-depth study, and doubtless some historians of racial thought will feel that certain aspects or individuals should have been dealt with in more detail.  However, Vermeulen’s focus is on anthropology as an alternative approach to human diversity, and his main point – that ‘anthropology and ethnology developed in separate domains of learning’, and that ‘the distinction between civil (political) history and natural history remained very much alive in the eighteenth century’ (pp.392-393), despite various attempts to relate them – is an important one.

It is scarcely possible, in a book of this scope, to avoid a few minor errors and omissions.  For instance, Vermeulen states that the remains of the ‘main ship, commanded by [Jean-François de Galaup de] La Pérouse’ during his 1785-88 expedition to the Pacific, ‘have never been retrieved’ (p.343).  In fact the wreck of the Boussole was located by Reece Discombe at Vanikoro, Solomon Islands, in the 1960s, while the final resting place of its companion ship, the Astrolabe, has been known since at least the 1950s (Coleman, 1987; Tryon, 2008).  Investigations conducted in 1986 and 1990 by the Maritime Archaeological Section of the Queensland Museum recovered substantial amounts of material from both wrecks (Stanbury and Green, 2004).  Nor is Vermeulen correct to describe it as ‘a mystery why Blumenbach labelled [his] fifth [human] variety “Malayan”’ (p.373); as Bronwen Douglas has pointed out, in the third (1795) edition of his De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa, Blumenbach explicitly justified his use of the name ‘Malay’ ‘on the linguistic grounds that this “variety of men” mostly spoke Malay’ (Douglas, 2008: 107).

These, of course, are mere quibbles.  I was rather more startled to find, in so thoroughly researched a monograph as Vermeulen’s, a passing reference to Gavin Menzies’ widely critiqued (if not debunked) 1421: The Year China Discovered the World (see Goodman, 2006; Henige, 2008; Melleuish et al., 2009; Rivers, 2004).  Any of the numerous credible studies outlined by Finlay (2004) could more effectively have been used to support Vermeulen’s essentially uncontroversial claim that ‘the Chinese sea voyages of Zheng He’, like ‘the Russian conquest of Siberia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, have ‘rarely been included in the canon of Western exploration’ (p.87).

Vermeulen’s close reading and careful analysis of little-known primary sources far outweigh these few flaws.  Before Boas is a substantial piece of scholarly work on a topic of ongoing interest.  It valuably complements the existing bodies of work dealing, on the one hand, with German-language contributions to the development of physical anthropology, and, on the other, with the history of British and American ethnology.  Historians of science, scholars of Enlightenment thought, and those interested in the peoples of Siberia are the obvious target audience, but I believe Before Boas also has much to offer to anthropologists, ethnologists, geographers, and historians, each of whom will learn a great deal about the history of their own discipline.

Hilary Howes is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Archaeology and Anthropology at The Australian National University, working on Professor Matthew Spriggs’ Laureate Fellowship project ‘The Collective Biography of Archaeology in the Pacific: A Hidden History’ (CBAP).  Her current research, which addresses the German-speaking tradition within Pacific archaeology and ethnology, builds on her PhD dissertation, published in 2013 as The Race Question in Oceania: A.B. Meyer and Otto Finsch between metropolitan theory and field experience, 1865-1914.  Following various stints as a research assistant, tutor, co-lecturer, guest lecturer, and associate course co-ordinator, she was employed most recently as Executive Assistant to the Ambassador at the Australian Embassy in Berlin, where her responsibilities included facilitating the repatriation of Australian Indigenous ancestral remains from German collecting institutions.

 

References

Coleman, R. (1987) ‘Missing: Explorer’s Disappearance Creates a 200-year-old Puzzle’, Australian Geographic 8: 86-99.

Douglas, B. (2008) ‘“Novus Orbis Australis”: Oceania in the Science of Race, 1750-1850’, in B. Douglas and C. Ballard (eds) Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750-1940. Canberra, ACT: ANU E Press, pp. 99-155.

Goodman, D.S.G. (2006) ‘Mao and the Da Vinci Code: Conspiracy, Narrative and History’, The Pacific Review 19(3): 359-384.

Finlay, R. (2004) ‘How Not to (Re)Write World History: Gavin Menzies and the Chinese Discovery of  America’, Journal of World History 15(2): 229-242.

Henige, D. (2008) ‘The Alchemy of Turning Fiction into Truth’, Journal of Scholarly Publishing 39(4): 354-372.

Melleuish, G., Sheiko, K. and Brown, S. (2009) ‘Pseudo History/Weird History: Nationalism and the Internet’, History Compass 7(6): 1484-1495.

Rivers, P.J. (2004) 1421 Voyages: Fact and Fantasy. Ipoh: Perak Academy.

Stanbury, M. and Green, J. (eds) (2004) Lapérouse and the Loss of the Astrolabe and the Boussole (1788): Reports of the 1986 and 1990 Investigations of the Two Shipwrecks of the French              Explorer at Vanikoro, Solomon Islands. Fremantle, W.A.: Australasian Institute for Maritime   Archaeology.

Tryon, D. (2008) ‘Vale Reece Discombe (1919-2007)’, Pambu: Pacific Manuscripts Bureau Newsletter 24: 10-11.

Urry, J. (2016) ‘Book Review: Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment’, TAJA: The Australian Journal of Anthropology 0 (Early View): 1-2, accessed 2     December 2016, accessible @: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/taja.12217/full

 

 

Book Review: ‘History Within: The Science, Culture, and Politics of Bones, Organisms, and Molecules’

Marianne Sommer, History Within: The Science, Culture, and Politics of Bones, Organisms, and Molecules, London and Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2016, 544 pages, cloth $50.00 ISBN 9780226347325.

by Chris Renwick

UNESCO – the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation – is probably best known to the public for the “world heritage site” status it has awarded to buildings, structures, and places including the Acropolis, the Galapagos Islands, and the Taj Mahal since it was founded in 1945. Given this role as a guardian of the globe’s heritage, it might surprise some people that UNESCO’s first director – and the man who insisted it include science as well as education and culture in its remit – was Julian Huxley (1887-1975). Grandson of “Darwin’s Bulldog”, Thomas Henry Huxley, Julian was a distinguished biologist in his own right and a public intellectual who had written numerous best-sellers, including Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942), been Secretary of the Zoological Society of London, and even won an Oscar for his documentary film, The Private Life of Gannets (1934). Julian Huxley’s connection with UNESCO made perfect sense. A campaigner for what he called “evolutionary” or “scientific” humanism, he believed there was no good reason to exclude the stuff of which we are made from our concept of heritage.

Huxley’s vision is one of the three overlapping evolutionary programmes – the others belonging to the American paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935) and the Italian geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza (b. 1922) – that Marianne Sommer has weaved into the compelling History Within. Charting almost 100 years across 15 deeply researched and packed chapters, Sommer tells a story about the efforts to come to terms with the biological, social, and cultural meaning of evolution during the twentieth century. Focusing on an evolving understanding of heritage, through which thinkers fused biology, society, and culture whilst avoiding reductionism, History Within documents a complex intergenerational project to provide us with a scientifically-informed account of what it is to be human. In so doing, Sommer takes us from the early twentieth-century world of what historians have called “mainline” eugenics, in which categories like race had essentialist properties, to the triumph of diversity, in both politics and biology, 70 years later.

Central to Sommer’s argument about those developments is the idea that they were both made possible by and a direct consequence of networks that included not only scientific and political ideas but also technology and modes of communication. Whilst Huxley went so far as resigning his university chair to devote more time to communicating his ideas to a wider public, Osborn worked as both a professor of biology at Columbia University and a curator at the American Museum of Natural History. Cavalli-Sforza, a former student of the British population geneticist R. A. Fisher, integrated his work at Stanford with the latest advances in computing, helping to lay foundations for both the Human Genome Diversity Project and the National Geographic-funded Genographic Project. Immersing ourselves in each of these thinkers’ worlds takes us from an effort to illustrate and encourage people to engage with human evolution through dioramas at the American Museum of Natural History to electronic maps showing the migration of genes across the globe. At each stage, new research techniques made it possible to look deeper into ourselves and increased the amount of information that accounts of human history could include. But they also furnished people like Osborn, Huxley and Cavalli-Sforza with new ways of thinking about humans and opened up new possibilities for people to engage with them.

As Sommer shows, these developments, which have created businesses that will decode genomes for a fee and the idea that heritage can be identified with our genetic makeup, have always existed within a complex and precarious set of political and cultural relationships. Indeed, History Within is most thought-provoking and insightful when it comes to the twentieth-century struggle to fashion a biology that worked productively with left and liberal politics. When allied with his science, Osborn’s somewhat unforgiving eugenics generated a story about humanity that was hierarchical and excluded races and groups. Huxley, however, saw eugenics as having more to do with equality of opportunity – an idea that provided the foundation for his later and more famous work on the UN Statements on Race, which declared race a social, not biological, category. Yet in a post-war world where Huxley’s once-progressive beliefs about eugenics suddenly sounded old-fashioned, Cavalli-Sforza transformed apparently empty biological categories into positive political statements. Genetic geography, with arrows and maps showing the global movement of people, told us about that a common humanity that stretched deep into the past and could be discovered within us.

As Sommer argues, though, problems have persisted, even with this apparent resolution to the challenge set by mid-twentieth-century biosocial progressives. One is the tendency to treat some communities as living fossils – reminders of some geographic and cultural staging post on the way to our own current state. Given that the science involves choices about which groups to sample, stories about genetic and cultural development map historical change in complex and politically fraught ways; for example, by making some people and places part of others’ pasts. At the same time, however, the constant pursuit of diversity in the biosocial sphere threatens to overload us with information, making it difficult to support a story about human heritage that is as coherent as it was when Cavalli-Sforza first started work – a scenario that will be familiar to anyone engaged with the politics of “big data”. Indeed, there is another order of questions that History Within alludes to, namely what all these developments in understanding our past might mean for our future. In the decades after the Second World War, when he was forced to drop eugenics as a frontline concern, Huxley wrote about something he called “transhumanism” – how our knowledge of biological and psychological science might be used to overcome our physical limitations. Diversity was an important part of this project because Huxley had come to believe that, given it was essential for evolutionary progress, society’s role was to compensate for its costs, such as disability. This was a very different answer, of course, to the one offered by earlier mainline eugenicists, who believed in the purity of races. In this respect, progressive social and political ideals have been integral to biology and our understanding of the human during the past 70 years. But with private companies becoming significant actors in the development and communication of these ideas, there are profoundly important questions about the ownership of human heritage, not to mention inequalities in participating in it and accessing any of its future benefits. Sommer offers us a profoundly important historical frame for thinking about this problem, not to mention the others that will emerge in future.

Chris Renwick is senior lecturer in modern history at the University of York and an editor of History of the Human Sciences. He works on the relationship between biology, social science, and politics, and is the author of British Sociology’s Lost Biological Roots: A History of Futures Past (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

 

The Holofernes Complex: a new edition of Michel Leiris’ ‘Manhood’

L’Âge d’homme preceded by L’Afrique fantôme, by Michel Leiris. Paris: Gallimard, 2014. Edited by Denis Hollier, in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon, Series: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, n°600. 1456 pages, 38 ill., ISBN: 9782070114559.

by Emmanuel Delille

A new edition of L’Âge d’homme (available in English as Manhood)[ref]Leiris, M. (1992) Manhood: A Journey from Childhood into the Fierce Order of Virility, translated by Richard Howard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.[/ref] by Michel Leiris (1901-1990), overseen by Denis Hollier, was published by the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade at the end of 2014. It constitutes the second volume of Leiris’ selected works, the first volume being La Règle du jeu[ref] Leiris, M. (2003) La Règle du jeu, ed. Denis Hollier, in collaboration with Nathalie Barberger, Jean Jamin, Catherine Maubon, Pierre Vilar, and Louis Yvert. Paris: Gallimard.[/ref]. The edition presents selected autobiographical texts in addition to L’Âge d’homme, including L’Afrique fantôme. (The latter is often translated into English as Ghostly Africa, but will be soon published for the first time as Phantom Africa in a new translation by Brent Hayes Edwards).[ref]Available in English in February 2017: Leiris, M. (2016) Phantom Africa, trans. Brent Hayes Edwards. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.[/ref] L’Afrique fantôme is an essay that is simultaneously controversial and foundational for French ethnology. Hollier’s editorial decision highlights Leiris’ contribution to the genre that we call autofiction, wherein autobiographical materials are rewritten using the techniques of fiction writing – in contrast to the raw journals kept by Leiris between 1922 and 1989. Hollier has proposed the general title L’âge d’homme fantôme[ref]Hollier, D. (2014a) ‘Préface’, in Michel Leiris, L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, XI.[/ref] to identify this corpus; following Edwards’ new translation of Phantom Africa, an English version of this title could be Phantom Manhood [ref]I am very grateful to Professor Brent Hayes Edwards (Columbia University), who answered my questions about his new translation and suggested Phantom Manhood as a general title in English.[/ref]

The volume is imposing; for this reason, my analysis focuses solely on L’Âge d’homme, the best-known of Leiris’ books among the general public (L’Afrique fantôme is the object of another review article, in the Japanese academic journal Zinbun).[ref]Delille, E. (2017) ‘Michel Leiris, L’Âge d’homme, précédé de L’Afrique fantôme. Édition de Denis Hollier, avec la collaboration de Francis Marmande et Catherine Maubon, (Paris, Gallimard, Collection: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, n°600, 2014, 1456 pages, ill.)’, Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, 47: in press. [/ref] From my perspective, it is not, for all that, his masterpiece; however, this narrative has benefited from its long availability as a mass-market paperback, unlike L’Afrique fantôme. Of Leiris’ books, it is also the one closest to the genre of confessional literature: it reveals the author’s sexual obsessions, the pathological shame he felt, and how he turned to the psychoanalytic interpretation of myths to narrate his experience.

Hollier soberly recounts the book’s context: after a period of anguish and impotence, Leiris began psychoanalysis in 1929 with Adrien Borel (1886-1966), one of the first French psychoanalysts, on the advice of his friend Georges Bataille (1897-1962). He then joined the Dakar-Djibouti Ethnographic Mission (1931-1933) and published a long travel narrative, L’Afrique fantôme (1934). L’Âge d’homme soon followed (1935), although it only really began to take shape after a second series of psychoanalytic treatments (1933-34).

While Leiris was at the very beginning of his scientific career in the 1930s, it is obvious that he drew on two disciplinary genres in order to breathe new life into confessional writing: psychoanalytic and ethnographic narratives. Indeed, as in L’Afrique fantôme, Leiris began with the principle that writing in the subjective mode increases the value of the testimony contained in the book and brings it closer to the truth. Eight chapters tell the story of his childhood and adolescence until the age of reason: marriage, the publication of his first works, and the beginning of a scientific career. Parental figures, his brothers and sister, and his first romantic relationships haunt the narrative, even though the figure of the beloved brother is not as well developed as in The Rules of the Game (La Règle du jeu). Nevertheless, the text is not structured as a family drama in the strict sense; instead, the plot is organized around a painting by Cranach that represents two biblical figures: Judith and Lucretia (Cranach, 16th century). Leiris saw in this diptych a kind of crystallization of his obsessions: two women who personify the two faces, desired and terrifying, of his fantasy. At one and the same time, woman is the object of man’s imperious desire (rape of Lucretia) and triumphant against her rapist (Judith decapitating Holofernes). The influence of psychoanalysis allowed him to identify his fascination with Cranach’s diptych with the concept of the castration complex, which Leiris believed explained his anxieties: “By psychoanalysis, I hoped to free myself from this chimerical fear of punishment, a chimera reinforced by the absurd power of Christian morality – which one must never flatter oneself that one has altogether escaped.”[ref]Leiris, M. (1992) Manhood: A Journey from Childhood into the Fierce Order of Virility, translated by Richard Howard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 138. See also: Leiris, M. (2014) L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, 889-890.[/ref] In Freudian psychoanalysis, the castration complex designates the anxiety that results from the Oedipus complex, which is to say the love children have for their mother, as it is checked by paternal power. This infantile fear represents a certain renunciation of the maternal object, but also an irreversible loss: it thus constitutes an existential anguish, which makes it susceptible to displacement onto substitute objects.

Yet one of the most interesting aspects of this new edition is precisely that it draws attention to the biblical personage with whom Leiris identifies: Holofernes. Indeed, in his foreword, Hollier justly stresses the disappearance of Judith and Lucretia in the conclusion of L’Âge d’homme; they are replaced by masculine figures, suggestive of homosexuality, that are designed to be more harmonious with the psychoanalytic theme of castration.[ref]Hollier, D. (2014b) ‘Notice: David et Goliath ou la castration’, in Michel Leiris, L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, 1227.[/ref] He also reproduces some of Leiris’ corrected proofs, one of which is soberly entitled Psychanalyse (Psychoanalysis, December 1930).[ref]Leiris, M. (2014) L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, 31.[/ref] which Leiris had originally intended to insert before a dream narrative.

From a historical point of view, we know that the interpretation of symbols played an important role in the beginnings of psychoanalysis, particularly in the first half of the 20th century. This practice first appeared as a technique for interpreting dreams, with the goal of filling out the material obtained in the patient’s free associations while recounting a dream. For the therapist, it helped both to overcome mental blocks and to explain Oedipal fantasies to the patient. But psychoanalysts soon extended this practice to interpreting symbols in myths, religions, and literary texts; Freud himself based his analysis of infantile sexuality on Greek mythology and published an essay on the biblical figure of Moses.

Hollier also presents a previously unpublished letter written by Leiris to his wife, dated May 30th, 1932. It explains that Borel’s virtue lay in his having understood that Leiris wanted to play the role of a mythological character: he would stage himself in the form of a new Holofernes[ref]Hollier, D. (2014b) ‘Notice : David et Goliath ou la castration’, in Michel Leiris, L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, 1229.[/ref], in an autobiographical narrative where confession would have a cathartic function. Finally, Hollier observes that castration is also an explicit theme of two texts, contemporary with Leiris’ writings, that were published in 1930 in the journal Documents; this journal was edited by Bataille and lists Borel as one of its contributors.

These materials make a convincing argument that Leiris identified himself with a mythological character. It is unfortunate, however, that the editors chose not to present more context about the appropriation of psychoanalysis by writers of this generation, and that they even forgot to list Borel in their index. This oversight is all the more curious because the very interesting appendices of this new edition contain a Note remise au docteur Borel (Note delivered to Doctor Borel, 1929)[ref]Leiris, M. (2014) L’Âge d’homme précédé de L’Afrique fantôme, ed. Denis Hollier in collaboration with Francis Marmande and Catherine Maubon. Paris: Gallimard, 912.[/ref], followed by Projets de mémoires (Ideas for Memoirs, 1930)[ref]Ibid., 913-915.[/ref], extracted from Leiris’ journal and contemporaneous with his psychoanalysis – a corpus of texts which should have been compared with those written by other former surrealists who undertook psychoanalysis with Borel.

And yet evidence indicating that these texts represent collective practices is not lacking, and editors might have remembered that in the Bible, Judith’s victims include not only Holofernes, but his army as well! Because in addition to Leiris and Bataille, we must also take into account Jacques Baron, Raymond Queneau, Colette Peignot (pseudonym: Laure), and Boris Souvarine, all of whom were in therapy with Borel. Moreover, Borel was not only a confidant of but also an intermediary between the members of this group, as their correspondence demonstrates. For example, in 1934, Baron revealed to Leiris that he too had taken the initiative of asking for help: “I’m not joking, but I’m heading to Privas to visit Doctor Borel! Tell no one about this idiocy, but I’m dreaming: I have all of hell in my head.”[ref]The original French text: “Je ne rigole pas, mais je pars pour Privas rendre visite au Docteur Adrien Borel. Ne souffle mot à personne d’une telle idiotie mais je rêve: j’ai tout l’enfer dans la tête.” Leiris, M. & Baron, J. (2013) Correspondance 1925-1973. Nantes: Joseph K., 149. The English translation here, by Marie Satya McDonough, is literal, because Baron’s expressions are not clear in French. We know that he suffered from depression after the War, but we must be wary of retrospective diagnoses. See also: Delille, E. (2016) ‘Michel Leiris & Jacques Baron, Correspondance. Édition établie, annotée et préfacée par Patrice Allain & Gabriel Parnet (Nantes, éditions Joseph K., 2013, 192 pages)’, Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, 46: 213-215.[/ref] That same year, Leiris wrote to Bataille: “If you see Borel after receiving this letter, give him my regards and tell him that I am trying hard to be good.”[ref]Bataille, G. & Leiris, M. (2008) Correspondence, trans. Liz Heron. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/Seagull Books, 105.[/ref] Similarly, in 1943 he wrote him about the posthumous publication of a text by Peignot: “Did you receive the Histoire d’une petite fille? All the copies planned have now been distributed, except Borel’s (but I expect to go and see him within a very few days).”[ref]Ibid., 160.[/ref] We thereby see how in the 1930s, psychoanalysis was a collective practice, much like automatic writing, introduced in The Magnetic Fields (Les Champs magnétiques) in 1920.[ref]Available in English as The Magnetic Fields: Breton A. & Soupault P. (1985) The Magnetic Fields, translated and introduced by David Gascoyne. London: Atlas Press.[/ref]

This intellectual social scene, enthusiastic about psychoanalysis, also had an impact on academic psychology. For example, after the suicide of the eccentric writer Raymond Roussel (1877-1933), Leiris was tasked with editing How I Wrote Certain of My Books[ref]Roussel, R. (2005) How I Wrote Certain of My Books, edited by Trevor Winkfield and introduced by John Ashbery. Boston: Exact Change.[/ref] (Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres, 1935), a posthumous autobiographical essay. The project led him to contact the psychologist Pierre Janet, a professor at the Collège de France and Roussel’s psychotherapist, in order to reconstruct his illustrious patient’s last days. Bataille would repeat the gesture in consulting Borel with regard to the posthumous edition of Peignot – and that is not all: in 1937, Leiris would join Bataille in founding a Société de Psychologie Collective, with Borel and Janet! This Society’s goal was to study the psychological factors in social facts. While it may be argued that this information is well-known, unfortunately the existing historiography on the crossed histories of psychoanalysis, psychology, and early 20th century avant-gardes reveals that the collaborations between the literary world and academic psychology are relatively unknown. I am thinking in particular of Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau’s research,[ref]Bacopoulos-Viau, A. (2012) ‘Automatism, Surrealism and the Making of French Psychopathology: The Case of Pierre Janet’, History of Psychiatry 23(3): 259-276.[/ref] which is well documented but too focused on Breton, and where Leiris is literally forgotten. Beyond Borel and Janet, Leiris would consult other psychotherapists after the war, including Julián de Ajuriaguerra (1911-1993), who would later become, like Janet, professor at the Collège de France. To sum up, it would have been interesting to establish the similarities and the differences between L’Âge d’homme and the accounts, diaries, and fictions that Leiris’ contemporaries left on the practice of psychoanalysis.

Emmanuel Delille is a historian of medicine and health, currently Visiting Scholar at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. He is an Associate Researcher at the Centre d’Archives en Philosophie, Histoire et Édition des Sciences (CAPHÉS, École Normale Supérieure, Paris) and at the Centre Marc Bloch (CMB, Humboldt University, Berlin). One of his major interests is the history of psychiatry: intellectual networks and comparative history between France, Germany, and North America – particularly Canada. Other research projects include the history of the French psychiatric hospital Bonneval (Eure-et-Loir) and the history of the French scholarly society “L’Évolution Psychiatrique” (created in 1924). His work in intellectual history focuses on epistolary material, above all, letters between scientists involved in scholarly networks.

Thinking in Cases – a call for submissions to History of the Human Sciences.

As part of our celebration of the work of the incomparable John Forrester, History of the Human Sciences (HHS) is hosting a review symposium around John’s final work: Thinking in Cases (Polity: 2017). The first essay in this collection ‘If p, then what? Thinking in cases’ was originally published in HHS back in 1996: (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/095269519600900301)

As part of our efforts to showcase the work of new and emerging scholars, HHS invites expressions of interest from all early career researchers (a flexible definition) whose work bears in some way upon the work John started with ‘Thinking in Cases’. We welcome anyone who would like to contribute to such a dialogue with John’s work, and with each other.

If interested, please send a short expression of interest (max 200 words) to the email address below, outlining your strengths as candidate for inclusion in such a review symposium. Depending upon response, we anticipate final contributions of c.3,000 words.

Deadlines:

 – Expressions of Interest: Monday 13th March, 2017.

 – Submission of Contributions: 31st October, 2017.

 – Publication in HHS: 2018.

If you have questions, please email Chris Millard: c[dot]millard[at]Sheffield[dot]ac[dot]uk

We look forward to hearing from you,

Felicity Callard (Editor-in-Chief) & Chris Millard (Reviews Editor)

What is philosophy of medicine good for?

An Interview with Cornelius Borck on his recently published book, Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung, 2016. Junius: Hamburg)

by

Lara Keuck

Philosophy of medicine is booming. In the past decade or so, several special issues, textbooks and anthologies have been published that promise to chart the field. One of the most recent additions to this body of literature is The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, edited by Miriam Solomon, Jeremy Simon and Harold Kincaid. While the editors strive to include a broad array of perspectives, their ‘predominant thread is the philosophy of medicine treated as part of the Anglophone philosophy of science tradition’ (p.2).

Earlier last year, Cornelius Borck, Professor of History of Medicine and Science Studies at the University of Lübeck in Germany, published a quite different book. Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine (in German: Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung) advocates a closer affiliation of philosophy of medicine with history, anthropology, and social studies of medicine, as well as with the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, moving it away from the predominant thread of analytic (and Anglophone) philosophy of science.

As more and more fields of life become medicalized, and indeed often seem to be inevitably medical, Borck urges his readers to stand back, and to look at the ‘functioning logics’’ (Funktionslogik) of evidence-based medicine, biomedicine, or palliative medicine from a critical distance. He puts the distinction between experiencing an illness and having a disease up front, and makes a strong argument that philosophy of medicine ought not be reduced to serving medicine in clarifying biomedical concepts of disease. Rather, philosophers of medicine should think about health and illness as phenomena of human life, for which medicine provides but one ‘pattern of interpretation’ (Deutungsmuster).

Borck exemplifies past and present approaches of medical reasoning. He opposes pre-modern doctors’ attempts of accompanying people through their illness to current trends of overly focusing on intervening medically into human conditions. Borck is not hesitant to make normative judgements, but they are carefully weighed, and they neither lend themselves to a general cultural pessimism nor to a naïve belief in technological progress. Drawing on a broad array of historical studies, the book rather wants to sensitize its readers to, first, an understanding of how medicine became the authority in providing, or at least searching for, scientific explanations for disorders of biological functioning; and, second, a critical engagement with this authority: birth, illness, pain, and dying became medical problems and to-be-solved ‘puzzles’ (Rätsel) of biomedicine. But are these really ‘problems’ that can, and should, be solved? Philosophy of medicine, in Borck’s reading, ought to be informed about medical developments, while propagating a philosophy of health and illness of its own that does not uncritically follow current medical trends. How does this interplay between closeness and distance work? And could this programmatic vision for philosophy of medicine work as an agenda for medical humanities?  I put these questions directly to Cornelius Borck, during a conversation that took place in Berlin and Lübeck, over December 2016

Lara Keuck (LK): I read your book as an invitation to think about what medicine is good for. You distance yourself from other approaches to philosophy of medicine that seem to be united by the basic assumption that medicine (if practiced well and based on solid scientific grounds) is good per se. You identify these approaches with Anglophone philosophy of science and the German tradition of theory of medicine. Do you think that these traditions are in principle ill-suited to address the questions that you raise?

Cornelius Borck (CB): I very much like your description of my book as ‘an invitation to think about what medicine is good for. There can be no question that medicine deals very effectively with many different medical problems and that access to affordable medical treatment is a high common good. As a specialized branch of philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine can thus zoom in on the ways in which biomedicine structures and organizes its practice, how it generates knowledge and orders it to explanatory theories, how its concepts articulate with decision strategies, how access to treatment is regulated and costs and benefits are distributed, etc. Unlike most other sciences, however, medicine does not start with an open search for knowledge; it cannot start from scratch, so to speak, as it deals with human suffering and illness. Illness and suffering precede any science; they call for medical intervention, which in turn shapes and formats states of illness into medical problems. Philosophy of medicine as the reasoning about the fundamental problems medicine is concerned with, should not start with an analysis of the problems as defined in medical practice but open its analysis to the formatting of these problems by medicine. Illness and suffering obviously go far beyond the boundaries of medicine, and medical practice addresses them explicitly and in scientific ways. Philosophy of medicine should hence also comprise a reflection about how it addresses health and illness.

LK: A couple of years ago, you co-edited a book called Maß und Eigensinn (‘Rule and Obstinacy’) that presented historical studies on medical sciences inspired by the work of the French epistemologist Georges Canguilhem. Your new book ends with the statement that philosophy of medicine can help society to articulate its obstinacy (Eigensinn) vis-à-vis medicine. Obstinacy captures only part of the meaning of ‘Eigensinn.’ In German, the term can also be applied to a person who shows integrity and self-coherence in her stubbornness. What does the concept mean to you?

CB: Well spotted! You are probably right in pointing this out as an idiosyncrasy of mine. Here, however, I had in mind what I regard the biopolitical relevance of philosophy of medicine: because biomedicine is so deeply entrenched in the current understanding of life and health, it defines almost every health related issue as a biomedical problem and assigns its interventions as the only salient solutions. Biomedicine’s descriptions of life-and-health-related problems tend to be taken as imperative and peremptory, without asking whether they serve a meaningful understanding of life and health – which obviously transgresses the limits of medical definitions in most instances. In his famous treatise on The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem determined the living as that form of being which not only follows rules and norms but establishes them in the first place – because of its obstinacy. Without such an obstinacy and autonomy life would simply not exist. This was the core idea of the book he finished in 1943, the same time he was an active member of the Resistance – and I think this is still an important message.

LK: While your book urges for more critical distance within philosophy of medicine, it is also filled with much details about recent developments, for instance in evidence-based medicine and palliative medicine. Could you elaborate a bit on how this interplay between closeness and distance to your subject of inquiry works? Do you regard this as a general methodology for philosophy of medicine?

CB: Many thanks for this zooming-in as it provides me the opportunity to state clearly that I do not conceive of philosophy of medicine as the search for a completely different form of medicine or as a credo for alternative and holistic medicine. On the contrary, I want to open philosophy of medicine and bring in the ‘critical distance’ you mention for discussing how well it serves in addressing the needs of particular patients. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the currently dominating framework of biomedicine and there is probably hardly a better way of doing medicine than ‘the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients,’ as David Sackett and his colleagues defined EBM. However, patients suffer from many different diseases with particular conditions and under very specific circumstances. The available evidence from clinical trials and other studies certainly offers important information, but for systematic, epistemological and pragmatic reasons this cannot cover every condition. A proper analysis of the details of EBM thus brings in critical distance as it reveals, for example, how EBM turns complex clinical conditions into discernible, treatable disease states and measurable treatment effects. Intended as the most accurate picture of the problems biomedicine has to deal with, EBM exerts a tendency to mistake the composite of EBM units for the world of medicine. And on another, more political and health-systems level, EBM introduced new forms of governance and regulation that increased transparency by linking medical services to cost effectiveness. Transparency is an important issue for democratic governance, but instead of opening new arenas for political debates on the health system, the decision-making often gets delegated to the anonymous power of statistical data.

Palliative care is an important topic for my analysis for two very different reasons: as a form of medical practice in the absence of curative treatment, it offers to explore how biomedicine deals with its own failure – and here I see a highly problematic medicalization of terminal care and dying, following on from the medicalization of birth. At the same time, palliative care operates in situations when medicine is cut off from its routines of effectiveness and hence allows us to study forms of practice adapted to individual needs. Where medicine gets disconnected from the imperatives of the perfect cure, a plurality of practices surface, which generate forms of significance and meaning which got lost with biomedicine’s effectiveness. In the absence of effective curative treatment, palliative care provides a window onto some of the other dimensions involved in medical practice that EBM and biomedicine have pushed to the side. At stake here is an ontology of disease conditions and states of illness according to a tinkering logic of care rather then the epistemology of biomedicine. Here, I see a special potential for phenomenology and the phenomenological analysis of states of illness.

LK: You extensively draw on anthropological, sociological and historical work in your book. Why did you decide to flag it as an introduction to philosophy of medicine?  You make clear that you are critical about the term ‘medical humanities.’ Yet, your book seems to me a prime example of both the fruitfulness of cross-talk between the meta-disciplines studying medicine and the importance of educating medical students (and society at large) to not only think about what is technically possible, but also about the limits of medical interventionism.

CB: I have already explained why philosophy of medicine should be more than the branch of philosophy of science specializing in medicine. As such a fundamental questioning, philosophy of medicine must build on the insights from science studies, anthropology and historical epistemology. If my book also serves as an introduction to medical humanities properly understood, I have no problems with that. In their present form however, ‘medical humanities’ often functions as a term describing an array of attempts to adapt biomedicine to the needs of patients without questioning the way biomedicine defines their problems. A good medical education must include some form of medical humanities and it should also offer some philosophical reflection on how biomedicine operates as a scientific practice – and in addition, philosophy of medicine should be the ‘cross-talk between the meta-disciplines studying medicine,’ as you just described it. Biomedicine has generated a wealth of possible and effective interventions. The problem with the technically possible is less the risks and costs involved, but the inherent tendency to foreclose a proper discussion about benefit. The limitations of medical interventionism transpire not along the limits of the technically possible but along their unlimited extension.

LK: Recently, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, and his wife, Priscilla Chan, advertised that they wanted to spend 100 billion dollars in biomedical (and bioinformatic) research, announcing the aim to eradicate all diseases by the end of this century. Your book reveals puzzle-solving to be the ‘working mode’ (Arbeitsmodus) of biomedicine and you argue that this is an ‘unattainable phantasm’ (uneinholbares Phantasma). You oppose philosophy of medicine to this reductionist understanding. Do you see a role for philosophers of medicine in publicly raising their voices in light of such news?

CB: The aim to treat more diseases and to treat them more effectively is very laudable. But it must be added that, on a global scale, the most pressing health problems are already now treatable and effectively manageable. Clean water, healthy food and good hygiene are still the most important factors determining health and disease epidemiologically.  Any initiative to eradicate disease by fostering biomedical research and bioinformatics is hence a very Western and elitist program. But that is another problem and not your question. Living without disease is an old dream, the hope for a new paradise. My suspicion about the Zuckerberg and Chan vision is that to eradicate all diseases does not lead to utopia but to an inhuman dystopia of perfected life, mistaking the ‘absence of disease’ with proper health – to echo the famous definition by the WHO. Alas, my scepticism regarding the Zuckerberg and Chan initiative does not rely on the assumption that diseases are necessary requirements for a meaningful life; it revolves around the understanding that frailty and failure are part and parcel of life itself – and not only of its defective forms. Strictly speaking, life can only be perfected by bringing it to its end. Philosophy of medicine can and should explain why the aim to eradicate disease is good but the underlying vision mistaken; and by the way, the Companion to Philosophy of Medicine you mentioned in the beginning is a nice example of how also the Anglophone branches of philosophy of medicine open up to this.

LK: Imagine Zuckerberg and Chan, inspired by the Human Genome Project, decided to reserve 1 % of this 100 billion dollar programme for the medical humanities. What should be done?

CB: They should, indeed, decide so, but for the form of cross-talk you mentioned! Since the Humane Genome Project we have ELSI, the study of the ethical, legal and social issues of biomedical research. This is more than a mere ‘nice to have,’ because it is important to explore these issues together with the scientific projects. But as it is implemented today, ELSI research follows rather the scientific agenda than interacting with it, and hence, discussion has started about how ELSI research can be better integrated in and connected with on-going biomedical research. In a similar way, medical humanities should be conceived not only as a training program but as a research area, interconnected with biomedical research. A substantial proportion of the 1 billion dollars should be hence allotted to patient groups and for citizen science projects, for articulating, fostering and incorporating their views, needs and values into the biomedical research agenda. And I would apply to Zuckerberg and Chan for funding an interdisciplinary PhD program in philosophy of medicine, offering philosophical reflection in combination with social studies and an immersion in clinical and lab-based research. Instead of specializing philosophers in a subfield, the program would train a new generation of cross-talkers with a thorough understanding of the articulation of research, needs and problems of the many actors in the health system. Their expertise and mediation will be required.

Lara Keuck specializes in history and philosophy of biomedical knowledge. She leads a junior research group on “Learning from Alzheimer’s disease. A history of biomedical models of mental illness”. The group is based at the Department of History at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and is funded through ETH Zurich’s “Society in Science – The Branco Weiss Fellowship”. Together with Geert Keil and Rico Hauswald she has just published an edited volume on Vagueness in Psychiatry (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Cornelius Borck studied medicine and philosophy and is director of the Institute of History of Medicine and Science Studies of the University of Lübeck, Germany. Before coming to Lübeck, he held a Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Language of Medicine at McGill University in Montreal. Beyond philosophy of medicine, he works on the history of brain research between media technology and neurophilosophy and on  the epistemology of experimentation in art and science.

Medizinphilosophie. Zur Einführung is out now from Junius Verlag.

Book Review: ‘Wilhelm Reich, Biologist.’

James E. Strick, Wilhelm Reich, Biologist. (London: Harvard University Press, 2015). 467pp. ISBN 9780674736092. (hardcover), £31.95

by Matei Iagher 

In his biography of Wilhelm Reich (1983), Myron Sharaf began the section on Reich’s scientific work with a warning that he did not have the requisite competence to judge this scientific work, and that the existing literature on this aspect of Reich’s work was too unreliable to be used  in making a critical assessment. This caveat could be read as a challenge for historians of science, but as the Reich archives only became available in 2007, the task of providing a competent, historical account of Reich’s biological work also had to wait. The wait has not been in vain, as with James Strick’s Wilhelm Reich, Biologist we now have a balanced and thoroughly researched account of Reich’s experimental work in the 1930s, which is likely to become the standard for any future historical investigation of Reich’s work.

Outside of a small circle of researchers and aficionados, Wilhelm Reich’s name does not immediately evoke associations with laboratory biological research. Rather, he is much more well-known as a psychotherapist, a psychoanalyst and Freudian dissenter, and above all, as a forefather of  the 1960s sexual revolution and as an intellectual source for later American and European counterculture. Much of the popular image of Reich is, even today, glazed over with an unsavory patina—an echo of the sensationalist reporting that tarnished his reputation in the 1950s, when the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also made him the target of a witch hunt (Reich’s books were burnt, and he was eventually imprisoned for contempt of court). Part of the aim of Strick’s book is to destroy this popular, pseudo-scientific aura that hangs around Reich, by showing that some of his most controversial theories were rooted in serious, cutting edge research.

Methodologically, the book draws on an extensive engagement with the Reich archive (his laboratory notebooks, correspondence, research and personal images), which is used to reconstruct Reich’s working methods, theoretical commitments and the process whereby he obtained his results. In addition, this is very much a book about debates in early twentieth century biology (and Reich’s place within them) as well as a book about changing paradigms in the life-sciences. The word ‘paradigm’ is not accidental, as Strick mentions Kuhn, and particularly his notion of ‘revolutionary science,’ more than once, as a way of describing Reich’s biological work. As he writes in the introduction: ‘Scientists, then, whose names we associate with revolutions—Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin, Pasteur, Semmelweiss—all, by definition, faced staunch, often irrational resistance to their ideas, not least from the established scientific authorities of their day. I argue that Reich’s work on biogenesis in the bion experiments, and certainly the visceral reactions it provoked, need to be understood in this light’ (p.8). This is pretty illustrious company, to say the least, but it reflects Strick’s sense that Reich drew the short straw of history and that he deserves a posthumous rehabilitation.

Wilhelm Reich, Biologist thus sets out to perform this rehabilitation, by examining Reich’s theoretical and experimental work in biology, undertaken in Oslo between 1934-1939. The book’s seven chapters chart Reich’s discovery of the ‘bions’ (microscopic particles that Reich saw as intermediary between inanimate matter and life) and outline the process by which Reich tried (and ultimately failed) to get his research validated by the wider academic community. As Strick’s focus is on Reich’s work as a biological researcher, the book contains only scattered remarks about Reich’s work as a psychotherapist and a psychologist in the 1930s. It is regrettable that Strick did not explore the connection with psychology in more depth, both in the case of Reich himself, as well as by comparing Reich’s forays into biology with those of other contemporary psychologists (such as Freud and Jung, for example, who both based their psychological systems on biological theories). Sulloway’s Freud, Biologist of the Mind (1979) or Shamdasani’s Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology (2003) might have helped to further contextualise the question of why an early twentieth century psychologist would look toward biology as a way of vindicating and expanding upon his psychological theories. At the same time, I can find no argument (other than the book’s already substantial length) for why the narrative does not continue beyond 1939, and into Reich’s American years.

The book’s first chapter (pp.16-63) examines the intellectual context of Reich’s experimental work, surveying the relevant debates in the turn of the century research in the life sciences (mechanism/vitalism, the concept of a specific life-energy, holism, dialectical materialism) and also surveys Reich’s personal journey from Viennese psychoanalyst to origin of life researcher. Chapter 2 (pp. 64-98) then proceeds to outline the process whereby Reich discovered the bions. As Strick explains, Reich was early on struck by an analogy between the amoeba’s extending of a pseudopod and the erection of the penis (p.61, 75). In a rather androcentric way, Reich argued that human sexuality in general was ‘functionally equivalent’ to the protist’s reaching out ‘toward the world’ with its pseudopod. Sexual arousal was rooted in the autonomic nervous system, which Reich claimed was a protozoan structure still present in the metazoan organism. Strick then traces the way in which Reich’s work on human sexuality precipitated his turn towards laboratory science.

After moving to Oslo in 1934, Reich began to study the bioelectric potential of the human skin. The conclusion of this study was that ‘the sexual process, then, is the biological-productive energy process per se’ (73). As Strick shows, it was this idea that, around 1936, led Reich to study the electrical charges of microorganisms like the amoeba. The discovery of the ‘bions’ followed from there: Reich was instructed to soak moss in water for ten to fourteen days in order to obtain a fresh culture of amoebas. Unsure of, or unconvinced by the explanation that amoebas came from spores present everywhere in nature, Reich proceeded to observe the process under the microscope. He concluded that before protozoa were formed, a series of vesicular shapes (i.e. bions) could be clearly seen detaching from the moss and then assuming some of the signs of life, such as motility and inner pulsation. The bions could be further cultivated through successive generations, using various preparations. Over time, through variations in the ingredients, Reich was able to produce bions with different properties.

In chapter 3 (pp. 99-145), Strick charts Reich’s dialogue and collaboration with Roger du Teil, a French philosopher who took an early interest in the bion work, and who offered to perform control experiments and to lobby on behalf of Reich’s theories among his French colleagues. This chapter allows Strick to go into more depth about the criticisms that were leveled against the bions, such as the fact that Reich was merely looking at bacteria picked up through air contamination, or that the lifelike movement he was observing was merely Brownian movement. As Strick convincingly argues, both of these critiques fell wide of the mark. Reich took particular care to sterilize his preparations, over and above what normal sterilization procedures at the time would have required. In one such instance, he burned soot to incandescence, before sticking it into his culture media (p.133). Such temperature would have been enough to kill off any common bacteria. Curiously however, Reich’s bions formed faster when the preparations where boiled than when they were not. Regarding the issue of the lifelike movements of the bions, Strick notes that Reich was using a state of the art microscope not usually available to most laboratories at the time and that the failure of other researchers to identify these movement was also due to a lack of requisite high-end apparatus (p.102, 127).

In chapter 4 (pp. 146-185), Strick halts the narrative in order to discuss Reich’s theoretical commitments and methodology. As Strick argues, Reich considered his dialectical-materialist method (later rebranded as ‘energetic functionalism’) as essential to understanding his work on bions. The chapter is an interesting case study of what constituted the scientific-method for Reich (as opposed to other contemporary dialectical materialists such as Alexander Oparin or J.D. Bernal) and serves as a prelude to chapter 5, which discusses Reich’s work on cancer. As Strick shows, Reich had theorised (on the basis of his own materialist ontology) that cancer was an endogenous disease, brought about by bions formed from disintegrating organic material, well before he ever looked at cancer tissue under the microscope. In chapter 5 (pp.186-217), Strick traces the development of Reich’s ideas about cancer and the experiments (some of them frustrated by his falling out with one of the main cancer specialists in Oslo) he devised to test them.

While Reich’s ontology was no doubt productive in setting him on the track of an original cancer theory, the public articulation of that ontology may have well have set him up for the response that followed from his Norwegian colleagues. As shown in chapter 6 (pp. 218-269), Reich was the target of a bitter press campaign meant to discredit his work, and, as some hoped, to get him to leave the country. As Strick shows, in ‘the small town of Oslo,’ the academic establishment did not take kindly to a dialectical materialist who was also a Jew, with no formal training in biology, and who evinced a radical stance toward sexuality and unorthodox ideas about the origin of life and cancer. As Strick also demonstrates, Reich’s Norwegian detractors had a vested interest in attacking Reich and his work: they were competing for the same funding from the Rockefeller foundation, the only major funding body around in the Depression era (p.227). The book’s seventh chapter (pp.270-310) seeks to bring the story full circle, by returning to the issue of the specific life-energy first broached in the first chapter. This final chapter thus charts Reich’s discovery of the radiating ‘SAPA bions’ and his eventual conclusion that the energy emitted by these bions was the specific life-energy or, as he began to call it in 1939, ‘orgone.’

In the Epilogue, Strick asks himself: ‘Is this story of purely historical interest?’ (311). The answer, one is led to believe, is clearly ‘no.’ Much like Hasok Chang, who has put forward the idea of a history and philosophy of science that functions as ‘complementary science,’ Strick is interested in the way in which historical knowledge might be useful in uncovering and helping to reinstate forms of scientific knowledge that have been obscured or deliberately left out in the development of scientific disciplines (Chang, 2004).  At the same time, to ask what relevance Reich’s work might have today is a question that follows from the attempt to take Reich’s work seriously—something which, as Strick reminds us, few historians and scientists have done before. And to take it seriously means to consider the proposition that Reich was indeed looking at something real, that his bions were not merely the imaginary constructs of a deluded dilettante. Strick’s work makes the reasoned case that Reich was indeed on to something. What that something might be is not for the historian to decide. Nevertheless, Strick seems to write for more than just a historical audience, and biologically minded readers might want to pick up on some of the suggestions that are scattered throughout the book. Even so, as Strick shows, Reich’s work diverged so radically from everything that happened in biology in the decades since the discovery of the bions that it may prove as difficult to give it a fair hearing today as it was in the 1930s.

 

Matei Iagher obtained his PhD in the History of Medicine from UCL in 2016, with a thesis about the history of the psychology of religion. He is now working on turning his dissertation into a monograph.

 

References

Chang, H. (2004) Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shamdasani, S. (2003) Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sharaf, M. (1983) Fury on Earth: A Biography of Wilhelm Reich. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Sulloway, F.J. (1979) Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend. London: Burnett Books.

 

“We should beware anyone who thinks they’ve got an easy application of biology to society” – an interview with Chris Renwick

We are delighted that Chris Renwick has joined the editorial team at History of the Human Sciences. Chris is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of York, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society; he is a historian of modern Britain, specialising in the intersections of politics, biology and society during the nineteenth century. His first book, British Sociology’s Lost Biological Roots appeared in 2012, and was shortlisted for the Phillip Abrams Memorial prize ; his second, Bread for All, a history of the welfare State, will be published by Penguin in 2017; he is us currently working on a new book on the intellectual origins of social mobility studies in Britain. To mark Chris’s cooption onto the editorial team, HHS web editor, Des Fitzgerald, caught up with him for a short interview.

 

Des Fitzgerald: Chris, as a historian, you work on the intersection of social science, biology, and politics in Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What first drew you to this area (I guess as a PhD student?) – and, in particular what made you situate it in a study of the discipline of *sociology* particularly, which of course was the topic of your first book?

 

Chris Renwick: Practically speaking, I came to work on sociology via my MA dissertation, which I wrote on the Scottish biologist and sociologist Patrick Geddes’ early career. I’d started out my MA with a broad interest in the social dimensions and applications of Darwinism, which I’d acquired through a number of modules I took with Paolo Palladino, Steve Pumfrey, and Peter Harman when I was an undergraduate at Lancaster. To be honest, I can’t remember precisely how I got to Geddes. But a good friend of mine was working on Lewis Mumford — the American social and architectural critic who was Geddes’ main, if reluctant, disciple — so Geddes was part of the intellectual furniture around me for a while. I could easily have carried on working on Geddes because his drift from T. H. Huxley’s laboratory in London to town planning in India is so fascinating. But I became more interested in a Donald MacKenzie, SSK-style, competing visions approach to the biology/society question, rather than one thinker’s programme. The significance and consequence of things doesn’t seem to make much sense without thinking through what the alternatives are at any given moment. This point crystallised for me when I was reading around the topic of the founding of the Martin White chair of sociology at the LSE — which is what my PhD thesis and book were about. I read a throw away sentence in a biography of Francis Galton that said something along the lines of “there were three candidates for this chair, which set the course for the field for the following decades, but the London  School  of Economics [LSE] didn’t see fit to choose a eugenicist. The reasons aren’t clear”. I thought that was a pretty fascinating question and couldn’t believe nobody had made a sustained effort to get the bottom of it. It was apparent immediately that my own pretty casual and unquestioned take on sociology as the general science of society actually obscured much more interesting questions about the content and practices that went into it.

 

On that latter point, it is probably significant I did my graduate degrees in History and Philosophy of Science [HPS], which intersects with Science and Technology Studies [STS] at certain points but is its own field for a number of historical reasons (people like Bob Olby and Roy Porter would trace those reason back to 1930s and the famous Soviet delegation at the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology at the Science Museum). HPS scholars — most of whom have an undergraduate background in the natural sciences — are generally instrumental when it comes to sociology: they use the intellectual tools when they need them but tend not to think of the history of those tools as something of interest. When I started my PhD I shared the common HPS assumption that the interesting questions about the relationship between biological and social science are on the biology side. I quickly realised that wasn’t true and that the hope and expectation around sociology — the desire for it to make people’s lives better — was what drove the project forwards. In fact, one thing that I came to appreciate was the importance biologists themselves attached to sociology as a project. That is something that I hope readers took from that work.

 

DF: As a sort of half insider/outsider – I’m interested in your reading of ‘British sociology project’ today.  At the end of your book, you ask – ‘how should sociology, as a general science of society, relate to biology, as a general science of life’? Whats your assessment of how well sociology is facing this question? 

 

CR: I’m never sure whether I’m a half insider or not when it comes to sociology. A number of sociologists have been incredibly enthusiastic about my work and have encouraged me to write for sociology audiences. I owe a great debt to Steve Fuller on that score; I’ve learned a lot from him. As a historian you always like to explain that things are as they are because of something that happened at a given point in the past. But you don’t always get to work on things where the current practitioners of the discipline say that the question itself is still open and the historical analysis is interesting for that reason. I think I’ve become a convert to the sociology project — and I do believe it is an intergenerational project in this country — through that process. It is still the case, though, that I find it difficult to take my historian’s hat off — the occasional pretence of neutrality — and really make the kinds of judgements that sociologists would prefer me to make about whether it was good or bad that certain things happened, like Leonard Hobhouse rather than Patrick Geddes being appointed the first Martin White Professor of Sociology.

 

As far as the question of how well sociology is doing with the biology question now, I have mixed feelings. For the most part, I think sociology has done and continues to do pretty well. I have argued before that British sociology has a long history — perhaps unique among the national traditions – of engaging with the biology question but that, for reasons that are not always clear, it has buried that story. There are plenty of people doing interesting work on the subject and one of the particularly interesting areas concerns looking at economic and social science approaches to biology, rather than vice versa, like Nik Brown, my colleague in sociology at York has been doing. I worry, however, about how the external environment, particularly the situation with funding bodies, is going to effect that. There are long standing concerns among historians that social science sources of funding are off limits, which has implications for the relationship between the two fields, not to mention particular kinds of history, which struggle to find favour with other funders. The challenge for sociology is going to be finding a way to engage with biology that doesn’t involve integrating with it, which is what might happen if funders indicate a preference for biology-led social science, as history suggests is always a great temptation.

 

DF: In some ways, you might be called a historian of the ‘biosocial’ – a term that is still is anathema to many because of the deeply ugly history of how biological and social projects have tended to inhabit one another. I know it’s banal to try to learn ‘lessons’ from history – but if we were to seek any, what might we take from the intellectual history of ‘social biology,’ in terms of the normative project of a ‘biosocial’ social science today?

 

CR: One thing that is apparent from the history of biosocial is the way it has seeped into so many aspects of our lives and thought. As you suggest, though, the biosocial has the potential to be quite toxic in its political dimensions. I’m not the greatest enthusiast for the idea that there are lessons that can be derived from history but one thing that does seem quite clear is that we should beware anyone who thinks they’ve got an easy application of biology to society. The truly interesting ideas are the biosocial ones that acknowledge the complexities and, as someone like Lancelot Hogben, whom I’ve done a lot of work on recently, would argue, that it isn’t either/or when it comes to things like heredity and the environment; there are actually distinct spheres that arise out of their interaction and need to be studied as such. It is worth noting that Galton’s original vision of eugenics certainly fits that bill. But the fact few people want to really get stuck into that probably underscores the point you made. This is probably a problem that involves reading history backwards, rather than forwards: taking the mid-twentieth-century programmes of forced sterilization in the USA and the Nazi regime as the obvious and only consequences of earlier ideas and assuming that people like Galton envisaged them. The history is much more complicated than that and a starting point for unravelling it is highlighting how it is actually embedded into the political world we still inhabit.

 

DF: You’re also now working on the history of the British welfare state. Can you say more about that project – and especially how it extends your attention to the meeting-points of biology and politics? I know you’ve written else about William Beveridge’s relationship to ‘social biology.’

 

CR: The book on the welfare state, Bread for All, which comes out in the Spring, was really a product of and companion piece to the work I’d been doing on Beveridge and social biology at the LSE. I was in the library looking at a collection of Galton lectures — annual events the Eugenics Society used to hold — and I saw Beveridge had a lecture in it. It’s not strange to find a social scientist from the early or mid-twentieth century who was interested in eugenics. When I checked the date of Beveridge’s Galton lecture, though, I suddenly realised that he had actually left the opening parliamentary debate about the Beveridge Report to go and give it. That kick started a chain of investigation that generated both the welfare state book and the book on social mobility research I’m writing up at the moment. It seems pretty obvious to me that there are strong eugenic strands running through the welfare state, as long as we appreciate that eugenics was about the environment rather simply genes by the mid-twentieth century and that the serious population research that came out of eugenics was an essential part of thinking about how to make everything work. All that has roots in a number of philosophical and political traditions, including utilitarianism, so I think it’s a pretty interesting story.

 

What is important about that state of affairs, I think, is that we appreciate that eugenics and biosocial science came in many different political flavours. There was a right wing version, which has overshadowed everything else for the obvious reason that it was and continues to be a spectacle. The much more productive sites of research, however, were on the left and among the technocratic liberals — the technical types Mike Savage has written about during the past decade. Beveridge was very much one of those thinkers. He was born in 1879 so he was part of that generation that lived and worked through the fuzzy period between the acceptance of evolutionary theory as fact and the “modern evolutionary synthesis”. So much of what we take for granted about politics and social policy after the Second World War came out of thinking about things in that uncertain environment. We’re used to talking about religion as not being a constraint on science but a source of inspiration. I think we should be doing more to talk about the biology-society intersection as a hugely productive site of work in that sense.

 

DF: The ‘human sciences’ is of course (to put to kindly) a capacious term – and the work of its *history* only multiplies the potential for confusion. What does this term mean to you? What does it mean to locate yourself (at least in part) as a historian of the human sciences?

 

CR: You’re absolutely right that the term means different things to different people. I certainly once thought of history of the human sciences [HHS] as being simply the history — as in the academic field — of the human sciences (primarily the psy-sciences). But I quickly realised that wasn’t right as dug deeper into the journal. The operative term is “human”, with the idea being we bring together people who are making some kind of contribution to our understanding of what the human is and what it has meant to be human since science became one of the dominant ways of knowing, to use that phrase, back in the early modern era. I would certainly locate myself in that sphere. After all, the welfare state, to name one example, was created in part to help people live meaningful lives.

 

DF: Finally: you recently organised a conference at York, on the future of the history of the human sciences – and you’re also co-editing a special issue of HHS on the same theme. So, then, Chris, in 200 words or fewer: what *is* the future of the history of the human sciences?

 

CR: The York conference was a really exciting event that gave everyone the opportunity to look forwards and back. One thing that was quite clear from all the papers and discussions (and this comes from heavily biased perspective of someone who helped orchestrate and organise those discussions) is that the future involves figuring out what the coalition of scholars and fields that deal with questions about the human looks like. There are challenges when it comes to broadening the field out to consider disciplines that haven’t always featured as prominently as others. I’m thinking here of the dominance of the psy-sciences, which was udnerstandable given, the context in which the field emerged. Broadening out in that way involves asking new questions and considering different practices. But, as a number of participants in the conference pointed out, it also involves asking serious questions about the status of the human in the twenty-first century. That, I would suggest, is the greatest challenge.

 

Book review: ‘Work, psychiatry and society, c. 1750-2015

Waltraud Ernst (ed.), Work, psychiatry and society, c. 1750-2015 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). ISBN: 978-0-7190-9769-0 (hardback), £75.00.

by Louise Hide

Given the amount of work that has been produced on labour and economic history on the one hand and asylum history on the other, it is surprising that the two have not been brought together more often. As this excellent volume shows, these sub-disciplines have much to learn from each other because the meanings given to patients’ work and occupation inside institutions have always reflected wider socio-political concerns on the outside.

In this volume, Waltraud Ernst has brought together 17 essays with great skill. Together, they demonstrate how ‘work’ with its myriad meanings has different significance – treatment, punishment, reform, exploitation, empowerment – within shifting conditions brought about by colonialism, revolution, war, economic change, and new medical ideologies. The collection makes a great temporal and geographical sweep across the entire modern period to the present day, addressing attitudes and praxis in North America, Japan, India, and Western and Eastern Europe.

The introduction is impressive. Ernst takes her discussion of patient activity back to the Graeco-Roman era before deftly contextualising it within later periods of feudalism and industrialisation, giving due consideration to the influence of socialism, urbanisation, colonialism and migration along the way. Whilst she identifies a number of themes that the volume addresses as a whole, she has organised the essays loosely by geographical region and time period. Generally, this works well. However, the contributions are a little uneven, not only in terms of their word length, but of their content and approach too: some span a century or more offering an overview of changing attitudes, while others make greater use of case studies to draw out more nuanced interpretations.

Inevitably, issues around gender, social class and race are drawn out of wider socio-political contexts, as are responses to overarching questions such as how the notion of ‘industriousness’ has been defined and redefined within medical, legal and moral discourse. Oonagh Walsh shows how in late nineteenth century Ireland work was used as a ‘test of sanity’ that was viewed by patients as a privilege and as a way of demonstrating their worth inside the institution. According to Monika Ankele, the meaning of work changed in one German asylum as its boundaries became more porous over a period of unemployment and economic instability during the Weimar Republic. This situation was not dissimilar to that of the First Republic of Austria where the ‘workshy’ were forced into labour facilities to receive moral improvement and where, as Sonja Hinsch has illustrated, the focus was not on whether or not patients worked, but on how they worked.

Mental hospitals have always faced accusations of exploiting patient labour. Kathryn McKay has analysed institutional reports in Canada to detail how alienists negotiated a course that demonstrated both the therapeutic and the economic benefits of patients’ work. Vicky Long addresses a later period to illustrate how industrial therapy of the 1950s was phased out with deinstitutionalisation, shifting the responsibility for employing people with mental health problems from the medico-social sphere to one that needed to be met by the labour market. John Hall traces the professionalisation of occupational therapy during the first half of the twentieth century, demonstrating how the shift from biological psychiatry to post-war psychosocial approaches, which included rehabilitation, also contributed to the process of deinstitutionalisation. Interestingly, the reverse was happening in Japan where, as Akira Hashimoto shows, ‘life therapy’ – a combination of work and occupational therapy – was introduced in the 1950s and psychiatric hospital populations continued to rise until the 1990s.

Gauging an individual’s moral and mental state by his or her approach to work is another important theme. Sarah Chaney comments on how ‘malingering’ as a concept was increasingly associated with some asylum patients who were believed to self-harm in order to shirk work. James Moran’s essay describes how New Jersey legislators used the meaning invested in productive work to signify whether or not an individual was deemed to be compos mentis and entitled to own property. Valentin-Veron Toma explores the ways in which work was promulgated as a social obligation, especially for the poor, in Romania’s psychiatric hospitals. Thomas Müller illustrates how attitudes to mental patient labour changed over a century in Germany, leading to the horrific consequences brought about by National Socialism from the 1930s.

Reflecting Ernst’s cross-cultural interests, many contributors examine the ways in which certain paradigms from the West were fused with local cultures and practices, particularly in colonial settings. Leonard Smith writes about the medical men who took their ‘civilising mission’ to the British West Indies where asylums also appropriated practices and attitudes from the plantations. A useful comparative approach within a single geographical region is taken by Jane Freebody who weighs up differences between France, Tuscany and Britain in the early nineteenth century when notions of moral treatment were gaining traction across the early discipline of psychiatry. Ben Harris demonstrates how American enthusiasm for this approach waned towards the end of the century as institutions became overcrowded with the chronically ill. And in Japan, Osamu Nakamura reveals how the practice of ‘boarding out’ patients to local families was brought to an abrupt end in 1950 as greater emphasis was given to a Western model of institutional care.

Jennifer Laws’ essay ends the volume with a beautifully written, thoughtful and intellectually sophisticated reflection on the relationship between reason and work, suggesting that scholars look beyond the standard framing of work to how meanings have been constructed out of the more intangible relationships between patients and staff. This is a superb ending to a rich volume of essays, which Ernst eloquently describes as offering insights into ‘moments when humans realise their humanity through their working relationships’. It will be of interest to historians of medicine and psychiatry, labour and economics, as well as to sociologists, anthropologists, and healthcare professionals.

Louise Hide is a Birkbeck/Wellcome Trust ISSF Fellow based in the Department of History, Classics and Archaeology at Birkbeck, University of London. Her monograph Gender and Class in English Asylums, 1890-1914 was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2014. Her current research is on cultures of harm and abuse in psychiatric spaces in the twentieth century.

 

Future of the History of the Human Sciences: Talks

“The Future of the History of the Human Sciences” – hosted jointly by History of the Human Sciences and Dr Chris Renwick – saw established scholars and early-career researchers gather in York for a two-day meeting in April 2016. The aim was to consider changes wrought in the broad interdisciplinary field of the history of the human sciences by new developments in the medical humanities, biological sciences, and literary/cultural theory. In so doing, these scholars not only marked the beginning of a new era for History of Human Sciences with a new editorial team, led by Felicity Callard, but also give thanks to the outgoing editor, James Good.

You can find out more about the conference on its website and in the reports on this blog from those who attended. Thanks to the kind permission of many of those who took part, we can now also make available recordings of a number of the talks. Abstracts for each talk can be found here.

• Roger Smith, “Resisting Neurosciences and Sustaining History”

• Steve Fuller, “Kuhn’s Curse and the Crisis of the Human”

• Des Fitzgerald, “The commotion of the social”

• Maurizio Meloni, “The Social as the Non-Biological: Genealogy and Perspectives”

• Jessica Hendy, “Molecular Archives of Human History: Moving Beyond Text-Based Sources”

• Michael A. Finn, “Possibilities and Problems with the Growing Archive”

• Peter Mandler, “The Language of Social Science in Everyday Life: What it Does, How it Circulates, How to Track it”

• Amanda Rees “Biocultural Evolution Then and Now: The Brain in Environmental Context OR Counterfactualising the History of Biology and Sociology”